Against Quasi-Fideism by de Ridder, Jeroen
AGAINST QUASI-FIDEISM
Jeroen de Ridder
Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the 
epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application 
of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among 
its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly con-
flicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a 
matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally 
grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets ei-
ther have unattractive consequences or are implausible.
1. Introduction
In a number of recent papers, Duncan Pritchard ventures to carve out a 
novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism.1 
It is inspired by Wittgenstein’s 1969 On Certainty and, indirectly, by John 
Henry Newman’s 1870 An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Qua-
si-fideism’s advertised attractions are legion. It can do justice both to 
the idea that religious belief can be epistemically rational and also that 
it is at bottom held on arational faith. It instantiates a more general and 
independently plausible epistemological framework. As a result, it not 
only inherits the benefits of this framework, but it also allows for a parity 
argument which shows that many critics of religious belief are unfairly 
holding religious beliefs to higher epistemic standards than ordinary 
belief. The general framework of which quasi-fideism is an instance is 
anti-skeptical, preserves plausible epistemic transmission principles, and 
avoids epistemic relativism.
Reflecting on this list, you might well think that quasi-fideism is too 
good to be true. In this paper, I argue that you would be right. I will first 
present quasi-fideism and explain how it is supposed to have the benefits 
indicated above. I will then raise objections to all three of quasi-fideism’s 
key tenets.
1Pritchard, “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism”; “Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason”; “Faith 
and Reason.”
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2. Quasi-Fideism
The rationality of theistic religious belief is precarious. It’s not a given that 
belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good supernatural being 
can be rational for intellectually responsible modern people. In fact, many 
have argued that it cannot.2 Typical responses to this charge come in two 
sorts. On the one hand, there is fideism, the claim that religious belief is 
not subject to the canons of rationality. It is a matter of blind faith and is, 
as such, beyond rational evaluation. Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and D. Z. 
Philips are associated with this idea.3 On the other hand, some claim that 
there is rational backing for religious belief, either in the form of experi-
ence-like grounds4 or of publicly available reasons and arguments.5
Both options suffer from well-documented problems.6 The former puts 
religious beliefs outside the sphere of rational discourse and hence immu-
nizes it from rational criticism. This does not only seem undesirable and 
implausible, it also makes it mysterious why anyone would have religious 
beliefs or faith, at least from a purely cognitive perspective. Moreover, 
it reeks of special pleading: what’s so different about religious beliefs to 
render them exempt from rational evaluation? The problem for the second 
sort of response is that it is controversial whether the rational backing 
that religious belief is supposed to possess is strong enough to withstand 
criticisms that are leveled against it and whether it really outweighs an-
ti-theistic evidence. The jury is still out on this, but both religious believers 
and atheists have had a hard time convincing each other that the support 
for their beliefs is strong enough to demand wide assent.
Quasi-fideism steers a middle course between these options. It attempts 
to appropriate the benefits of both, while avoiding their problems. Con-
sider the following two seemingly conflicting observations. First, religious 
people’s core beliefs—such as the belief that God exists—are very stable 
and don’t respond to rational considerations in the way more mundane 
beliefs do. Belief in God is psychologically stable: people don’t just suspend 
it when they encounter rational criticisms as they might with other beliefs. 
Belief in God is also doxastically stable: it acts as a fulcrum to evaluate which 
objections to it must be taken seriously and which can be rejected.7 Core 
religious beliefs constitute part of a person’s worldview. Second, more 
specific religious beliefs often do appear to be held in a paradigmatically 
2Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism; Sobel, Logic and Theism; Oppy, Arguing about Gods; 
Tooley’s contributions to Plantinga and Tooley, Knowledge of God; Howson, Objecting to God; 
Philipse, God in the Age of Science. Several popular-scientific books also belabor this conclu-
sion (Dawkins, God Delusion; Dennett, Breaking the Spell; Hitchens, God Is Not Great; Stenger, 
God), but their argumentative rigor is, to say the least, not always up to snuff.
3Nielsen, “Wittgensteinian Fideism”; Phillips, Faith and Philosophical Inquiry.
4Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.
5Copan and Moser, Rationality of Theism; Swinburne, Existence of God; Craig and Moreland, 
Natural Theology.
6See the references above.
7Pritchard, “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism,” 144–145.
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epistemically rational manner. Many religious believers are intelligent, 
well-informed, and there is nothing wrong with their cognitive func-
tioning. Reflective believers can cite reasons or other grounds for their 
beliefs and revise them in light of new things they learn. An acceptable 
epistemology of religious belief, then, should show how religious beliefs 
can be rationally evaluable.
Quasi-fideism takes its cue from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.8 
Hinge epistemology holds that rational evaluation is necessarily local in 
the sense that it can only happen within a framework that holds fixed 
a number of so-called hinges: commitments that cannot be supported 
further and cannot coherently be doubted. Since these commitments 
constitute the framework for rational evaluation, they are not themselves 
rationally evaluable.9 Thus Wittgenstein:
The questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which 
those turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investiga-
tions that certain things are in deed not doubted.10
Quasi-fideism’s central proposal is that we ought to think of the existence 
of God as a hinge commitment for religious believers. Commitment to God’s 
existence constitutes part of a religious believer’s framework for rational 
evaluation. More specific religious beliefs, however, can be rationally eval-
uated inside this framework. Says Pritchard:
We should think of religious belief as also involving a hinge commitment 
to the existence of God that is immune to rational evaluation. . . . Religious 
belief involves a fundamental commitment to God’s existence which is both 
highly stable from a psychological point of view, but which is also part of the 
essential background to a wealth of further more specific religious beliefs 
that the subject holds.11
And more recently:
The crux of the matter is that the basic religious convictions of one who has 
faith will form part of that person’s hinge commitments, and hence will be 
part of the bedrock against which rational evaluations are undertaken.12
Pritchard doesn’t make it explicit whether he takes quasi-fideism to char-
acterize the situation of all, many, or merely some religious believers. Since 
8To be sure, Wittgenstein himself never applied the ideas in On Certainty to religious 
belief. The fideism that is associated with his views on religious epistemology is inspired 
by the posthumously published notes about Wittgenstein’s lectures on religious belief 
(Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations).
9What I present here is Pritchard’s rendering of hinge epistemology. There is some con-
troversy about how best to construe the position. See Ranalli, “Deep Disagreements” for 
discussion of its different guises.
10Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§ 341–342.
11Pritchard, “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism,” 149–150.
12Pritchard, “Faith and Reason,” 117–118.
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he writes without qualification about “religious believers,” “persons of 
faith,” and “theists,” however, I will assume that he has at least the second 
option in mind and perhaps even the first. Quasi-fideism is supposed to 
be a default option for religious believers; it describes the epistemological 
situation of a typical religious believer.
To unpack quasi-fideism further, I summarize it in three theses. First:
FRAMEWORK: The claim that God exists has framework status for 
religious believers.
FRAMEWORK captures the faith-character of religious belief. Commit-
ment to God’s existence is part of a framework in which other beliefs are 
rationally evaluated. Specific religious beliefs thus presuppose it. This is 
not some special feature of religious belief—there is no special pleading on 
the part of the religious believer here. It is a general fact about our prac-
tices of rational evaluation, regardless of their domain. All our ordinary 
beliefs about the world likewise presuppose hinge commitments which 
cannot rationally be doubted, e.g., that there is an external world, that 
every individual has biological parents, that cats do not grow on trees, etc.
This short list of hinge propositions might look like a ragtag bunch. 
This raises the specter of epistemic relativism: the thesis that the pos-
itive epistemic status of beliefs (such as their rationality) depends on a 
framework of norms that vary with local conceptual or cultural conditions 
and lack universal validity and that there are no facts of the matter about 
which of these norms are correct.13 Because the quasi-fideist is explicit 
in seeking to avoid relativism,14 she ought to explain how it can be that 
the view does not entail the possibility of incommensurable but equally 
legitimate epistemic frameworks since it seems quite possible for people 
to have incompatible but equally legitimate sets of hinge commitments. 
Pritchard thinks the quasi-fideist can avoid this conclusion because, first 
appearances notwithstanding, hinge commitments do have something in 
common: “What all our hinge commitments express is our basic certainty 
that we are not radically and fundamentally in error. Call this our über 
hinge commitment.”15 For example, the fact that cats don’t grow on trees is 
13Baghramian and Carter, “Relativism.”
14See Pritchard, “Epistemic Relativism,” “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism,” 156, “Faith 
and Reason,” 112.
15Pritchard, “Faith and Reason,” 111; cf. also his “Epistemic Relativism.” The introduction 
of this über hinge creates a tension in Pritchard’s construal of hinge epistemology. On the 
one hand, the claim is that hinge commitments are partly constitutive of the framework for 
rational evaluation and are, as such, arational and incapable of being supported by rational 
reasons or grounds (see also below). On the other hand, they are supposed to follow from the 
über hinge. But presumably, if the über hinge logically entails specific hinge commitments, 
it provides a reason for them. After all, if recognized logical implication doesn’t provide rea-
sons, nothing does. So either there really is only one hinge commitment—the über hinge—or 
there is some unaccounted-for relation between the über hinge and specific hinge commit-
ments that makes it false that the former is a reason for the latter. In what follows, I will 
ignore this tension and continue to assume, like Pritchard, that both the über hinge and more 
specific commitments can be hinges. Thanks to Emanuel Rutten for raising this point.
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fundamental to our grasp of biology and our basic understanding of what 
the world is like. If they were to grow on trees, we would be radically and 
fundamentally in error. Hence, it follows logically from the über hinge 
that cats don’t grow on trees. Similarly for other outlandish possibilities 
that go against our basic grasp on the world. What ultimately remains 
fixed, then, is the über hinge, rather than various more specific hinge com-
mitments which follow from the über hinge. The latter in fact do allow 
for variability over time and between cultures. If, say, sinister future bio-
technology will allow us to grow cats on trees, it would no longer be a 
hinge commitment that they don’t since this wouldn’t violate our basic 
understanding of what the world is like anymore and, hence, it would no 
longer follow from the über hinge. The über hinge itself, however, would 
stay in place. Hence, epistemic relativism isn’t a live threat.16
A second implication of the idea that something is a hinge commitment 
is that it is arational:
ARATIONAL: The claim that God exists is an arational commitment.
Arationality is not irrationality. Hinge commitments do not have bad 
credentials from the perspective of rationality; they “precede” or “stand 
outside” rationality. According to ARATIONAL, a believer’s commitment 
to God’s existence differs from her more specific religious beliefs. Beliefs 
like “God has helped me” or “God loves all people” can be supported, crit-
icized, or otherwise rationally evaluated—someone might point to biblical 
passages or theological considerations—but belief in God itself is presup-
posed in all of this.
The idea of arationality can be further fleshed out by considering its 
technical sense in Wittgenstein’s thought. For Wittgenstein, giving rational 
grounds requires that grounds are more certain than the belief they are sup-
posed to support. This is why hinge commitments are groundless: nothing 
we might offer to support them will be as secure as those commitments 
themselves. In fact, anything we offer would already presuppose those very 
hinge commitments. This explains why Moore’s response to the sceptic fails 
as a reply: Seeing that you have two hands isn’t more secure than your belief 
that you do. To suggest that the former could rationally ground the latter 
manifests confusion about the nature of rational grounding.17
ARATIONAL has it that the existence of God is a hinge commitment for 
believers in this sense. ARATIONAL paves the way for a parity argument 
in defense of religious belief. As far as rational grounding is concerned, 
religious belief is in the same boat as ordinary belief, scientific belief, 
16A general discussion of whether Pritchard’s über hinge strategy can avoid epistemic 
relativism successfully would lead us too far afield for present purposes, but see Carter, 
“Epistemic Pluralism” for some worries.
17Pritchard, “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism,” 149, “Faith and Reason,” 106. While hinge 
commitments are rationally groundless, they are not arbitrary or optional. They are given 
with our nature, “animal,” “swallowed down” as part of our worldview, and involve a kind 
of primitive trust (“Faith and Reason,” 107).
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and other types of belief. They are all ultimately groundless in the sense 
explained above. The objection that belief in God is ultimately without 
grounds, then, is nothing against it because the same is true for our belief 
in an external world and other hinge commitments. Religious belief has 
no special problem.
Together with FRAMEWORK, ARATIONAL also accounts for the psy-
chological and doxastic stability of belief in God alluded to above. Such 
stability makes perfect sense if God’s existence is an arational hinge com-
mitment that partly constitutes the framework for rational evaluation.
The third tenet of quasi-fideism is:
NON-BELIEF: Religious believers’ attitude vis-à-vis the claim that God 
exists is not that of belief.
Hinge commitments aren’t beliefs, at least not of the sort that mainstream 
epistemology is concerned with and that many take to be a component of 
knowledge. Hinge commitments are non-optional, “visceral,” “animal.” 
They involve “primitive trust,” are unresponsive to rational consid-
erations, and are ‘swallowed down’ rather than acquired via rational 
processes. All of this sets them apart from knowledge-apt (rational) belief. 
Belief is, by its nature, a truth-directed mental state and is, as such, respon-
sive to rational considerations.18
NON-BELIEF is the key to solving what Pritchard calls the “contain-
ment problem.”19 If a believer’s commitment to God’s existence is arational, 
this threatens to infect all her religious beliefs because they all presuppose 
the existence of God directly or indirectly. Or, in the other direction: if, 
as quasi-fideism maintains, a believer’s specific religious beliefs can be 
rationally grounded, then so should her commitment to God’s existence. 
After all, a straightforward inference could take you from a rationally 
grounded belief that, say, God loves you to the conclusion that God exists. 
Rational support for the former belief ought to carry over to the latter, or 
so it would seem. To put it in general terms: rational support for religious 
belief, or lack thereof, seems difficult to contain.
The epistemologically sophisticated reader will have noticed that the 
issue at stake here is the transmission of rational grounding.20 While ev-
eryone agrees that rational support transmits when people competently 
reason their way from one belief to another, formulating a principle that 
spells out the conditions under which this happens is far from easy. For-
tunately, however, NON-BELIEF allows you to circumvent this difficult 
18Pritchard, “Faith and Reason,” 108. Pritchard thus takes NON-BELIEF to follow from 
ARATIONAL. I think the two claims can nonetheless be considered separately. That hinge 
commitments are immune from rational evaluation might imply that they aren’t beliefs, but 
the reverse doesn’t hold: Attitudes that aren’t beliefs might nonetheless be subject to rational 
evaluation.
19Pritchard, “Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism,” 151–154.
20Wright, “Warrant for Nothing”; Davies, “Epistemic Entitlement”; Moretti and Piazza, 
“Transmission.”
229AGAINST QUASI-FIDEISM
task entirely. It doesn’t matter what a correct transmission principle looks 
like, the point is that it applies to beliefs. So hinge commitments cannot be 
fed into it. Hence, the commitment that God exists cannot receive rational 
support from more specific religious beliefs, nor does its lack of grounds 
render other religious beliefs equally groundless. Not only is the contain-
ment problem pre-empted, everyone can also hold on to their favorite 
transmission principle.
Having presented quasi-fideism’s key tenets and proclaimed attrac-
tions, I will now go on to criticize it.
3. FRAMEWORK and Epistemic Relativism
According to FRAMEWORK, the claim that God exists belongs to the 
framework within which rational evaluation can take place for the reli-
gious person, but isn’t itself susceptible to such evaluation. I will argue that 
this commits the quasi-fideist to epistemic relativism, i.e., the existence of 
incompatible but equally acceptable frameworks for rational evaluation.21 
On this understanding of epistemic relativism, it is possible for there to 
be two agents who hold conflicting beliefs but are equally rational by the 
standards of their respective epistemic frameworks, without there being 
any rational means by which one might persuade the other. Now, one 
might think that epistemic relativism is true, perhaps even an inevitable 
part of the human condition. The problem is, however, that Pritchard ex-
plicitly claims that the quasi-fideist can avoid it. This is not the case, as I 
will now show.
How does FRAMEWORK lead to epistemic relativism? For that, it suf-
fices if there is a mirror image of FRAMEWORK for unbelievers:
ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK: The claim that God does not exist has 
framework status for religious unbelievers.
Just as God’s existence can function as a hinge commitment for typical 
believers, God’s non-existence can fulfill this role for at least some unbe-
lievers.22 Given ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK, epistemic relativism follows 
quickly. Imagine two subjects, Theist and Atheist, for whom God’s exis-
tence and non-existence respectively have framework status. They further 
have conflicting beliefs about the origin of the universe. Theist believes 
that God created the universe, Atheist doesn’t—she believes there is a 
complete naturalistic explanation for its existence. It seems perfectly 
possible for their beliefs to be equally rational within their respective 
frameworks, assuming that both have competently evaluated the relevant 
arguments, objections, and rebuttals relative to their frameworks. Hence, 
we have epistemic relativism.
21Baghramian and Carter, “Relativism”; cf. also Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge and Carter, 
Metaepistemology and Relativism for development and discussion of this version of epistemic 
relativism.
22Note that ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK doesn’t need to hold for all unbelievers, or even 
for many unbelievers. It suffices for my argument if it has this status for some atheists.
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ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK is plausible for two reasons. First, it follows 
directly from parity considerations. If theists are granted the courtesy of 
getting God’s existence as a hinge commitment, atheists should be treated 
likewise. There are no obvious differences between God’s existence and 
his non-existence that would bar the latter but not the former from having 
framework status. Both are fundamental metaphysical claims about what 
exists. Moreover, both have formidable philosophical arguments for and 
against them and both have been held by many thoughtful, intelligent, 
and well-informed people throughout the ages. Given that we’re thinking 
about these commitments as arational, these considerations cannot give us 
rational grounds for thinking that they can both be hinge commitments, 
but at least they show that there is practical or social parity between the 
two, which lends further support to ATHEISTIC FRAMEWORK.23
Second, there is reason to think that God’s non-existence in fact func-
tions as a hinge commitment for some atheists. It seems pretty clear that 
belief in God’s non-existence is highly psychologically and doxastically 
stable for convinced atheists, in the senses specified in the previous sec-
tion for religious believers. They will not suspend it immediately when 
they encounter a theistic argument or reports of religious experiences. If 
someone were to do this, we would question whether she really was an 
atheist in the first place. Atheistic belief can also be doxastically stable: 
Commitment to atheism will function as a fulcrum by which other beliefs 
are evaluated. Upon hearing about a theistic argument or religious expe-
rience, a convinced atheist will think it rational to believe that there must 
be some problem with the argument or a fully naturalistic explanation 
of the experience. The phenomena parallel the ones Pritchard pointed to 
in support of the thought that God’s existence is a hinge commitment for 
believers.
Some written avowals of atheistic commitments also fit the picture very 
well. Thomas Nagel, for instance, once wrote:
I want atheism to be true and am made uneasy by the fact that some of the 
most intelligent and well-informed people I know are religious believers. It 
isn’t just that I don’t believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my 
belief. It’s that I hope there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t 
want the universe to be like that.24
Presumably, someone who hopes God does not exist and does not want 
him to exist, will not easily give up his commitment to God’s non-existence 
and will actively seek to conform his beliefs to this basic atheistic tenet.
23My argument applies specifically to the case of God’s existence and non-existence as 
hinge commitments. I don’t rely on a general parity principle about hinge commitments to 
the effect that, for any H, if H is a hinge commitment for some people, not-H can be a hinge 
commitment for other people too. Such a general principle is implausible. For instance, 
“there is an external world” plausibly functions as a hinge commitment for lots of people, 
but there’s no reason to think that, therefore, “there is no external world” can also be a hinge 
commitment. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this point.
24Nagel, The Last Word, 130.
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How then, one might wonder, does Pritchard think quasi-fideism avoids 
epistemic relativism? In section 2, we noted that the general strategy of 
Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology for avoiding relativism is to maintain 
that, behind superficial temporal and contextual variation in specific hinge 
commitments, there is a deeper and fixed commitment to an über hinge, 
namely that we are not radically and fundamentally mistaken. Since the 
various more specific hinge commitments are supposed to follow from 
the über hinge, this preempts the possibility of different and incompatible 
sets of hinge commitments. It is far from clear, however, that this strategy 
wards off the more specific charge that quasi-fideism leads to relativism. 
God’s existence (or non-existence) isn’t at all something that plausibly fol-
lows from the über hinge. Rather, it would seem that both God’s existence 
and his non-existence are compatible with our being not radically and 
fundamentally in error about the rest of the world.25 The simple observa-
tion that numerous knowledgeable and intelligent people disagree about 
whether God exists, while there is not a hint of disagreement about other 
paradigmatic hinge commitments, provides strong evidence for this. And 
unless the quasi-fideist wants to defend the wildly implausible claim 
that all atheists are thoroughly confused or mistaken about the logical 
implications of the über hinge, it seems she, too, is forced to accept the 
compatibility of God’s non-existence with the über hinge. But then my 
earlier argument stands: Both God’s existence and his non-existence can 
be hinge commitments and epistemic relativism ensues.
But isn’t there a sense in which religious believers are “radically and 
fundamentally in error” if God doesn’t exist? After all, God’s existence 
has fundamental metaphysical import, so to be mistaken about it is to be 
fundamentally mistaken. That may well be right, but such metaphysical 
fundamentality does not entail epistemological fundamentality of the 
sort relevant to our discussion. God’s existence is not epistemologically 
fundamental to all of our other, more mundane non-theological beliefs 
about the world and ourselves in the way that claims like “there is an 
external world” or “I have two hands” are. If we are to imagine ourselves 
being mistaken about these latter claims, the basis of our epistemic self-
trust would be overturned: we would have no grip anymore on which (if 
any) of our faculties to trust, what to take as evidence for what, and how 
to expand our rationally based beliefs. This is not what happens when we 
consider God’s non-existence.
But, one might press further, perhaps I’m still being too cavalier about 
this. Religious believers could insist that God’s existence really is epistemo-
logically fundamental to their outlook, just like other hinge commitments 
and hence does follow from their understanding of the über hinge. In 
support of this line of thought, they could point out that, according to 
25My claim is that this is true in the actual world. Perhaps there are worlds in which 
God’s existence is so fundamental to people’s outlook that it does follow plausibly from the 
über hinge. An example might be a world in which Berkeley’s idealism is true and generally 
known to be true. Thanks to Chris Ranalli for making me clarify this point.
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their religious outlook, an external world wouldn’t have existed if God 
hadn’t created it nor would it continue to exist without his sustenance. 
Theists who accept Plantinga’s proper functionalist epistemology26 or his 
evolutionary argument against naturalism,27 moreover, will add that if 
God didn’t exist, we couldn’t trust our cognitive faculties, so that, without 
God, we become epistemologically unhinged.28 Hence, the commitment to 
God’s existence really does infect most of what theists believe.
Now the proponent of quasi-fideism faces a dilemma. For note that this 
objection builds a fair amount of sophisticated metaphysics and episte-
mology into the contents of the religious believer’s hinge commitment. 
Notions like creation and sustenance may be part of an ordinary believer’s 
understanding of God, but—taking it for granted that most people do not 
contemplate the finer points of modal metaphysics—necessary existence 
most likely isn’t, let alone the tenets of Plantingian epistemology. So the 
dilemma is this: either the hinge commitment of God’s existence is meta-
physically and epistemologically florid, or it isn’t.
Someone who takes the first horn faces two problems. First, hinge 
commitments are supposed to be basic and uncontroversial claims about 
the world and ourselves; things we cannot rationally doubt. Surely, this 
is not the case for the metaphysical and epistemological baggage that is 
now built into the claim that God exists. A cursory glance at the history 
of theological and philosophical thinking reveals that the topics of divine 
creation, sustenance, necessary existence, and proper functionalism are 
the subjects of vehement controversy. Second, it is empirically implau-
sible that many religious believers really are fundamentally committed 
to all of this. Perhaps some philosophically sophisticated theists are, but 
certainly not ordinary religious believers. But then epistemic relativism 
again follows, for we now have different and incompatible versions of the 
same hinge commitment among religious believers, which boils down to 
having different and incompatible hinge commitments.
Someone who takes the second horn walks right back into the arms of 
my earlier argument. If the claim that God exist is construed more mod-
estly, i.e., without an extensive array of metaphysical and epistemological 
implications, it just doesn’t follow from the über hinge.
FRAMEWORK leads to epistemic relativism. Anyone who thinks epis-
temic relativism is implausible and who was attracted to quasi-fideism 
because it claims to avoid it, should thus reject quasi-fideism.
26Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.
27Beilby, Naturalism Defeated?; Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 307–350.
28I’m ignoring a philosophical complication here. According to classical theism, God 
exists necessarily. Imagining what would be true if he didn’t exist involves evaluating coun-
terpossibles, which is notoriously tricky. If we cannot say much about the truth-values of 
counterpossible claims, we cannot be very confident about what would be the case were God 
not to exist and so the champion of quasi-fideism may be on thin ice here. Nonetheless, I’ll 
grant that the claims I’m putting in the quasi-fideist’s mouth appear initially plausible.
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4. ARATIONAL and the Epistemology of Theistic Belief
A second tenet of quasi-fideism is that the commitment to God’s existence 
is not subject to rational evaluation but precedes rationality. I will now 
show that accepting ARATIONAL has highly counterintuitive conse-
quences for how we ought to evaluate (a) the intellectual lives of religious 
believers and unbelievers and (b) a number of influential projects from the 
history of thinking about religious belief.
First, consider a moderately reflective ordinary believer, Sue. Sup-
pose she grew up in a Christian family. In high school and college, she 
acquainted herself with some of the arguments for and against God’s 
existence and came to doubt whether God exists. Through conversations 
with friends and mentors and by reading some philosophy of religion, 
she became convinced that there are good replies to atheistic arguments 
and that theistic arguments are in pretty decent shape, as far as philo-
sophical arguments go. She regularly goes to church and experiences 
God’s presence in the liturgy. Being the moderately reflective individual 
she is, she sometimes considers the epistemic status of some of her be-
liefs (although not necessarily under this very description). Upon doing 
so, she finds herself firmly believing both that God exists and that she 
is rational in believing so. She considers that she has grounds for belief 
in God—arguments, testimony, and experience—that she isn’t flouting 
any intellectual duties, that many people she knows and trusts share her 
belief, and that, qua epistemic qualities, her belief resembles many of her 
other beliefs—for instance about the acceptability of various scientific the-
ories or about what other people think—which she also considers wholly 
rational.
This is a perfectly normal and common case of religious belief: Lots 
of believers are like Sue. What’s more, Sue’s self-evaluation seems highly 
compelling. But the quasi-fideist who subscribes to ARATIONAL must re-
ject Sue’s self-assessment. For her to think that her belief in God is rational 
is an error, because it is an arational hinge commitment. It is a serious 
blow for a religious epistemology if it ascribes to most ordinary believers 
a deep-seated confusion or error about their epistemic self-appraisals.29
Second, the same point holds a fortiori for all those intellectually so-
phisticated believers throughout the ages—theologians, philosophers, 
scientists—who have argued for God’s existence or the rationality of belief 
in God. Luminaries like Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, 
John Duns Scotus, René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel 
Kant, William Paley, and many others, up to present-day figures such as 
Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig, and Alexander 
29A parallel argument can be run for moderately reflective ordinary atheists. They, too, 
would be making a category mistake in thinking that their commitment to God’s non-ex-
istence is rational. See Ranalli, “Revisionism” for an analogous criticism of Pritchard’s 
construal of Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.
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Pruss are all confused or mistaken in thinking that their belief that God 
exists is, or even could be, rational.30
The proponent of quasi-fideism, however, has to maintain that their 
confusion runs even deeper, and extends to the meta-level of system-
atic thinking about belief and rationality—something which not many 
ordinary believers typically engage in. Someone who subscribes to ARA-
TIONAL is committed to a radical assessment of influential projects in 
the history of religious epistemology. Traditional natural theology, i.e., 
“weighing arguments for and against God’s existence,”31 was a major 
intellectual endeavor, to which most of the great philosophers and theolo-
gians of the past and several renowned scientists from the early modern 
period until the nineteenth century devoted at least some of their time. 
The quasi-fideist must judge that all of this was deeply confused, for it is 
impossible to give rational arguments for or against hinge commitments. 
Natural theology is tilting at windmills. Pretty much the same holds for 
everyone who has contributed to the development of Reformed episte-
mology.32 The point of reformed epistemology is to show how belief in 
God can be warranted (and justified and rational) for a typical believer, 
without being based on arguments. The quasi-fideist must again hold 
that the basic thrust of this project embodies a category mistake: since 
God’s existence is a hinge commitment for the typical believer, rationality 
doesn’t apply to it.
This is a significant cost for the quasi-fideist. She has to maintain that 
large swathes of otherwise impressive thinkers have been confused or 
mistaken. Perhaps committed Wittgensteinians won’t think much of this, 
as they already believe that the history of philosophy is littered with pseu-
do-problems that need to be dissolved rather than resolved. For them, it 
would not come as a surprise that the language of religious epistemology, 
30Again, a parallel point would hold (mutatis mutandis) for intellectually sophisticated 
atheists. Insofar as quasi-fideism allows for atypical believers for whom God’s existence 
doesn’t function as a hinge commitment (cf. section 2 above) but instead as a regular belief, 
it is open to its proponents to suggest that quasi-fideism doesn’t capture the situation of 
these intellectually sophisticated believers. In reply, this move appears ad hoc: What else 
besides the desire to escape this objection is supposed to motivate the idea that belief in 
God is not a hinge commitment for these theists? Moreover, the quasi-fideist must still 
ascribe confusion to intellectually sophisticated believers: In so far as they take theistic 
arguments to be of relevance to the epistemic situation of the typical believer, they are 
mistaken.
31Taliaferro, “The Project of Natural Theology,” 1. Likewise Alston, Perceiving God, 289: 
“Natural theology is the enterprise of providing support for religious belief by starting with 
premises that neither are nor presuppose any religious belief. We begin from the mere ex-
istence of the world, or the teleological order of the world, or the concept of God, and we 
try to show that when we think through the implications of our starting point we are led to 
recognize the existence of a being that possesses attributes sufficient to identify Him as God.” 
Cf. also Chignell and Pereboom, “Natural Theology.”
32Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality; Alston, Perceiving God; and Plantinga, 
Warranted Christian Belief are the seminal works, but they have spawned a vast secondary 
literature.
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too, has “gone on holiday.”33 But those of us who are trying to assess qua-
si-fideism without such prior commitments may well demur.
These costs might be worth it, though, if the benefits of ARATIONAL 
offset them. I don’t think this is the case. The most important payoff is that 
it allows you to make sense of the psychological and doxastic stability 
of belief in God as discussed above.34 But while this is arguably a phe-
nomenon that any religious epistemology should account for, there is no 
reason to think that quasi-fideism outperforms the competition. Let me 
hint at just two alternatives. The Reformed epistemologist proposes that 
belief in God can enjoy strong positive epistemic status if it has been pow-
erfully produced by a properly functioning sensus divinitatis.35 As a result, 
belief in God will be very stable, not because it is an arational commit-
ment, but because it has a significantly stronger epistemic status than, say, 
atheistic arguments. Linda Zagzebski’s recent defense of rational religious 
belief presents another live option.36 She provides an elaborate argument 
that not only epistemic self-trust, but also epistemic trust in others is a 
basic and inescapable requirement of rationality. She then employs this 
argument to show how and why trust in a religious community or in re-
ligious authorities can be intimately connected with epistemic self-trust 
and hence perfectly rational. If she’s right about this, we can explain the 
remarkable stability of belief in God by noting that it is tied up with self-
trust and therefore rationally inescapable.
In addition, there is an important mirror phenomenon that religious 
epistemology should account for and that quasi-fideism does not handle 
so well. Arguments may not play a major role in why people adopt or 
abandon belief in God, but they are not irrelevant either. Atheists often 
appeal to evil, divine hiddenness, or absence of evidence in justifying 
their non-belief in God. Theists often mention the appearance of design, 
the fact that something rather than nothing exists, or religious experience 
to account for why they believe. Apart from inveterately dogmatic folks 
on both ends of the spectrum, many people testify to having at least ques-
tioned their convictions in the face of rational arguments for or against 
God’s existence. Neither side is insensitive to arguments. The point can be 
brought into even sharper focus by comparing it to other hinge commit-
ments. Philosophical arguments have never brought anybody to seriously 
doubt the existence of an external world, save perhaps a few overly 
enthusiastic philosophers. Arguments for skepticism or metaphysical an-
ti-realism hardly get any real-life traction in comparison to arguments for 
and against the existence of God. This is a problem for ARATIONAL: If 
hinge commitments are supposed to be impervious to rational arguments, 
33Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 38.
34The arationality of hinge commitment perhaps also plays a role in deflecting undesir-
able applications of epistemic transmission principles. I’ll return to this in the next section.
35Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief.
36Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, ch. 9.
236 Faith and Philosophy
then it’s hard to explain why people would be moved even a bit by the-
istic or atheistic arguments. Perhaps the quasi-fideist can come up with 
responses to this challenge, but on the face of it, quasi-fideism fails to save 
the phenomena here.
In sum, ARATIONAL leads to radically revisionary evaluations of 
the intellectual lives of believers and unbelievers and of some influential 
large-scale projects in the history of thought. It doesn’t have exclusive 
benefits and cannot easily account for the actual influence of theistic and 
atheistic arguments. We should thus reject ARATIONAL and thereby qua-
si-fideism.
5. NON-BELIEF and Belief in God
The third tenet of quasi-fideism is that a religious believer’s attitude vis-
à-vis the claim that God exists is not belief in the typical epistemologist’s 
sense, but something else.37 I will argue that NON-BELIEF, too, fails.
First of all, Pritchard suggests that NON-BELIEF follows from ARA-
TIONAL: Because hinge commitments aren’t susceptible to rational 
evaluation, they aren’t proper beliefs.38 This means that the arguments 
against ARATIONAL from the previous section also undermine NON-BE-
LIEF. If I’m right that the claim that God exists is rationally evaluable, 
then the support ARATIONAL might have lent to NON-BELIEF crumbles 
and we have not yet been given a reason to think that a believer’s attitude 
regarding God’s existence is not belief.
A second problem with NON-BELIEF is that religious language is lit-
tered with belief-talk. The expression “belief in God” and its cognates are 
ubiquitous both in ordinary religious discourse and in official statements 
of faith. Many ordinary theists will not hesitate for a moment to affirm 
that they believe in God. “Religious believer” is the default way to describe 
someone with religious commitments. Both the Apostles’ Creed and the 
Nicene Creed, accepted by all major Western Christian denominations, 
open by explicitly proclaiming belief in God.39 The first of the six articles 
37A quick caveat: as Pritchard rightly notes (“Faith and Reason,” 108n9), the notion 
of belief itself might not pick out any one clearly delineated thing. Eliminitavists (e.g., 
Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism”) and interpretationists (Davidson, Inquiries; Dennett, 
The Intentional Stance, “Real Patterns”) argue that “belief” doesn’t refer to anything at all but 
is merely useful parlance. Others claim it is multiply ambiguous (Stevenson, “Six Levels”) or 
vague (Schwitzgebel, “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account,” “A Dispositional Approach”). 
Digging into these concerns would lead us too far astray. For present purposes, I assume that 
that there is at least one fairly sharp concept of belief, which many of our run-of-the-mill 
beliefs fall under and which epistemologists like to think about. NON-BELIEF then claims 
that a religious believer’s attitude towards God’s existence does not fall under that concept 
of belief, even though it might fall under one or more other concepts that also have some 
plausible claim to the title of belief.
38The assumption that rational evaluability is an essential feature of beliefs might be dis-
putable, but since I suggested we bracket questions about the exact nature of (different kinds 
of) beliefs, I’ll grant it here and assume that this is indeed a feature of the kind of belief under 
discussion.
39The Apostles’ Creed reads: “I believe in God, the Father almighty, Creator of heaven and 
earth.” The Nicene Creed states: “We believe in one God, the Father almighty, Maker heaven 
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of Islamic faith also is belief in God. And indeed surah 4:136 of the Quran 
reads: “Whoever disbelieveth in God . . . , he verily wandered far stray.”
You might protest that belief in God should not be equated with be-
lieving that God exists. That is correct as far as it goes, but it doesn’t help 
the defender of quasi-fideism. Although belief in X indeed involves more 
than mere belief that X exists, the former does entail the latter. You cannot 
believe in X unless you also believe (perhaps dispositionally) that X ex-
ists.40 To believe in something or someone is to have faith or trust that 
it (s/he) is up to some task. But of course, no non-existing thing is up to 
any task! This explains why we can believe in Roger Federer and trust 
that he will win another grand slam title but cannot believe in Frodo and 
have faith that he will get the ring of power to Mount Doom (except in 
his fictional world). When theists avow their belief in God, then, they also 
believe that God exists. The prima facie evidence of informal and formal 
religious language speaks against NON-BELIEF.
The quasi-fideist could try to deflect this evidence by pointing out that 
religious language was never meant to express anything in philosophi-
cally rigorous terms and that, therefore, it glosses over the philosophically 
important distinction between a believer’s attitude vis-à-vis God’s ex-
istence (a hinge commitment) and that vis-à-vis more specific religious 
propositions (ordinary belief). This response strikes me as question 
begging. Believers use the word “belief” freely and indiscriminately to ex-
press both their attitude towards God’s existence as well as various more 
specific religious propositions. Nothing in religious language or practice 
suggests that the meaning of “belief” shifts from one case to the other. In 
the absence of independent reasons to adopt NON-BELIEF, we shouldn’t 
endorse the revisionary interpretation of the evidence that it necessitates.
A third strike against NON-BELIEF is the fact that believers’ commit-
ment to God’s existence looks an awful lot like belief. On all accounts of 
belief, having a belief involves having certain characteristic dispositions 
to act and reason.41 On the traditional representational account, it further-
more requires having a mental representation of what you believe. For 
instance, if I believe that there is an open bottle of wine in my kitchen, I 
will be inclined to silently assert this to myself or out loud to others on 
suitable occasions, I will be disposed to walk to the kitchen if I long for 
a glass of wine, I will reason that I don’t need to open a new bottle, and 
I might have an internal representation of the bottle in my mind. Exactly 
parallel things hold for the average believer. She will assert to herself or in 
public that God exists, she might act or refrain from acting in certain ways, 
she might use the existence of God as a premise in her reasoning, and she 
might have some sort of mental representation of God existing. We have 
and earth, and of all things visible and invisible.”
40Cf. De Ridder and Van Woudenberg, “Worshipping, Believing” for further discussion of 
the relation between belief-in and belief-that.
41See Schwitzgebel, “Belief” for an overview of different accounts of belief.
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good reason, then, to conclude that the typical religious person indeed 
believes that God exists.
The quasi-fideist might retort by suggesting that these considerations 
do not tell against her proposal because she already admitted that hinge 
commitments are similar to ordinary beliefs in many respects. However, 
they are crucially different in others. This was the point of ARATIONAL. 
Because commitment to God’s existence lacks the feature of being ratio-
nally evaluable, it cannot be a belief. That proposal failed, however, and 
so we don’t know in what way a believer’s attitude vis-à-vis God’s exis-
tence is supposed to be different from that of belief. Until this has been 
explained, we should take appearances at face value.42
Fourth and finally, let’s consider whether the work that NON-BELIEF 
was supposed to do might offer independent reason to accept it after all. 
If NON-BELIEF solves a pressing problem for the rationality of religious 
belief, this could compensate for its revisionary interpretation of religious 
language. Its theoretical fertility could offer strong circumstantial evidence 
of its correctness, even if—as we just saw—the direct evidence speaks 
against it. Recall that NON-BELIEF was the key to solving the “contain-
ment problem.” If commitment to God’s existence isn’t rationally based, 
don’t all specific religious beliefs become arational, since they presuppose 
God’s existence? NON-BELIEF solved this problem by denying that com-
mitment to God’s existence is a proper belief. Hence it cannot be fed into the 
epistemic transmission principles that generate the containment problem.
In spite of its cleverness, I think that this is a solution not worth 
wanting. Far from being a genuine problem, the containment problem 
correctly highlights that belief in God and more specific religious beliefs 
are in the same boat as far as rational basing is concerned. If belief in God 
can be rational, so can more specific religious beliefs. If it cannot, neither 
can more specific religious beliefs. Let’s ask ourselves whether someone 
could really believe rationally that, say, God loves her while lacking any 
rational basis for her commitment to God’s existence.Consider how a 
self-professed quasi-fideist should describe her own situation: “I have 
good reasons to believe that God loves me but I don’t have any reasons to 
think that he exists.”43 At the very least, this sounds paradoxical.44 The fact 
42As Chris Ranalli pointed out to me, the quasi-fideist could reply to this argument by 
proposing that hinge commitments should be likened to faith. Perhaps having faith in God’s 
existence entails a willingness to use God’s existence in one’s practical reasoning but not in 
one’s theoretical reasoning. This an intriguing suggestion, but evaluating it would require 
more extensive discussion of the attitude of faith and its relation to that of belief, for which 
space is lacking here. See Howard-Snyder, “Does Faith Entail Belief?,” “Three Arguments”; 
Rettler, “Analysis of Faith”; Ichikawa, “Faith and Epistemology” for recent discussion.
43Reformulations that stay closer to the quasi-fideist’s preferred terminology don’t remove 
the sense of paradox either. Cf: “My belief that God loves me is rational, but my commitment 
to his existence is arational.” Or: “I have good reasons to think God loves me but cannot 
provide any reasons / grounds / rational support for my commitment to his existence.”
44For further support, note that quasi-fideism licenses (a) utterances that seem Moore-par-
adoxical: “God loves me, but I don’t have any reason to believe God exists” and (b) utterances 
that look like abominable conjunctions in Keith DeRose’s sense (DeRose, “Solving the Skep-
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that NON-BELIEF allows for this possibility, then, actually counts against 
it. Instead of accepting NON-BELIEF, we should say belief in God is what 
it appears to be, i.e. belief, hang on to whatever epistemic transmission 
principle we find plausible, and thereby accept that the presence (or ab-
sence) of rational support for general theistic belief transmits to specific 
religious beliefs and vice versa.
You might object that this criticism is too general and too quick. It 
affects all forms of Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology and thus rashly 
rules out a potentially promising solution to general skepticism. Consider 
that a parallel utterance concerned with external world skepticism sounds 
equally problematic: “I have good reasons to believe that there is a tree in 
front of me, but I don’t have any reasons to think that there is an external 
world.” The hinge epistemologist may grant that this sounds paradox-
ical but will add that this is because language can be deceptive. Besides, 
having a feasible solution to skepticism is no small feat, so we should just 
learn to live with it.
This companions in guilt defense won’t work, however, for anti-skep-
tical belief and religious belief are crucially different, as we have noted 
repeatedly above. We’re much more confident that it is rational to believe 
that there is a tree in front of us when we see one than we are that it is, or 
can be, rational to believe that God exists. This is evidenced by the fact that 
there is virtually no serious debate about the former but plenty about the 
latter. It is also witnessed by the fact that most epistemologists consider it a 
desideratum for an acceptable theory of knowledge or rational belief that 
it renders radical skepticism false,45 whereas few, if any, would maintain 
that a theory of knowledge or rationality automatically fails if it cannot 
account for rational belief in God. So the idea that you have no reasons for 
your commitment that there is an external world—understood in the Witt-
gensteinian sense as meaning that nothing we might offer in support is as 
certain as that commitment itself—certainly has some initial plausibility. 
Not so for commitment to God’s existence: it’s not as if nothing a believer 
might offer in support of the claim that God exists will be as certain as 
that claim itself. Someone might be much more confident that she experi-
enced, say, a deep sense of being loved by something transcendent, than 
she is that God exists. Or a natural theologian might be more confident of 
the premises of a cosmological argument than of its conclusion.46 So my 
criticism of quasi-fideism doesn’t overgeneralize: Someone could accept a 
Wittgensteinian response to general skepticism but refuse to take onboard 
its quasi-fideistic extension.
tical Problem”): “I have good reasons to believe that God loves me, but I don’t have any 
reasons to deny God’s non-existence.” Thanks to Chris Ranalli for pointing this out.
45Cf. Bonjour, Epistemology; Lemos, An Introduction; Pritchard, What Is This Thing.
46And note that something similar would be true for atheists for whom God’s non-ex-
istence would be a hinge commitment. They, too, might be much more confident that they 
have never experienced God, or that religious experience can be explained naturalistically, 
than that God doesn’t exist. The hinge model thus doesn’t quite fit the atheistic case, either.
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Summing up: we should not believe NON-BELIEF. ARATIONAL offers 
no support for it, it flies in the face of the direct evidence against it from 
religious language and practice, and it is of no good theoretical use.
6. Conclusion
I have argued that all three of quasi-fideism’s key tenets are untenable. 
FRAMEWORK leads directly to epistemic relativism. ARATIONAL vio-
lates the phenomenology of religious life and systematic reflection on it 
and doesn’t have any significant theoretical benefits. NON-BELIEF fails to 
do justice to the evidence of religious language and practice, and the solu-
tion it offers to the containment problem is unattractive. My conclusion 
will be obvious: quasi-fideism offers quasi-solutions to real problems in 
religious epistemology.47
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